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Abstract Classical epistemic logic describes implicit knowledge of agents about
facts and knowledge of other agents based on semantic information. The latter is pro-
duced by acts of observation or communication that are described well by dynamic
epistemic logics. What these logics do not describe, however, is how significant infor-
mation is also produced by acts of inference—and key axioms of the system merely
postulate “deductive closure”. In this paper, we take the view that all information is
produced by acts, and hence we also need a dynamic logic of inference steps showing
what effort on the part of the agent makes a conclusion explicit knowledge. Strong
omniscience properties of agents should be seen not as static idealizations, but as
the result of dynamic processes that agents engage in. This raises two questions:
(a) how to define suitable information states of agents and matching notions of explicit
knowledge, (b) how to define natural processes over these states that generate new
explicit knowledge. To this end, we use a static base from the existing awareness liter-
ature, extending it into a dynamic system that includes traditional acts of observation,
but also adding and dropping formulas from the current ‘awareness’ set. We give a
completeness theorem, and we show how this dynamics updates explicit knowledge.
Then we extend our approach to multi-agent scenarios where awareness changes may
happen privately. Finally, we mention further directions and related approaches. Our
contribution can be seen as a ‘dynamification’ of existing awareness logics.
J. van Benthem (B) · F. R. Velázquez-Quesada
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1 The problem of omniscience: what is ‘missing in action’
The usual discussions of the problem of omniscience in epistemic logic revolve around
the distribution axiom K (ϕ → ψ) → (Kϕ → Kψ). Is knowledge closed under draw-
ing logical inferences? If it is, so the story goes, then we have idealized our knowing
agents too much.
But this story is misleading on two accounts. First, with the usual semantics of
epistemic logic, the K operator really just describes implicit semantic information of
the agent, which definitely has the preceding closure property. The point is rather that
closure need not hold for a related, but different intuitive notion, viz. explicit “aware-
that” knowledge Ex ϕ, in some suitable sense to be defined. So, what we really need
is not “epistemic logic bashing”, but a richer account of agents’ attitudes. Our first
question, then, is how to define explicit knowledge.
But there is more. The interesting issue is not whether explicit knowledge has deduc-
tive closure. It is rather: “what do agents have to do to make their implicit knowledge
explicit?” Consider the premises Ex (ϕ → ψ), Ex ϕ of the distribution axiom, saying
that the agent explicitly knows both ϕ → ψ and ϕ. As explicit knowledge should be
also implicit knowledge, these should imply Kψ , that is, the agent knows ψ implicitly.
But crucially, in order to make this information explicit, the agent has to do some work,
namely, perform an act of “awareness raising” that leads to Ex ψ . Stated more syn-
tactically, the usual implication Ex (ϕ → ψ) → (Ex ϕ → Ex ψ) contains a gap [ ]:
Ex (ϕ → ψ) → (Ex ϕ → [ ]Ex ψ)
and in that gap, we should place an action. Note that, then, the agent is no longer omni-
scient, but she is not defective either: with the right repertoire of actions available, she
can do awareness raising as needed.
This paper explores these ideas. We first recall some simple epistemic awareness
models and their known axiomatization. Then, we explore some proposals for defining
explicit knowledge, picking one that we will work with. Next, we define basic dynamic
actions that modify our models, and provide examples of their behaviour, alone and
in combination. Representing the actions in the language yields a sound and complete
logic that clarifies our initial issues. We also develop some formal properties and raise
some open problems. Then we move to the multi-agent case, developing tools for pri-
vate and even unconscious versions of our actions, which were public so far. Finally,
we relate our proposal to earlier ones, and end with conclusions and further directions,
in particular, toward agents with beliefs that are modified by default inferences.
2 A static system for different agent attitudes
In the long-standing discussion about the omniscience problem (Sim 1997; Moreno
1998) there is general agreement that there should be a difference between explicit
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knowledge of an agent, and the implicit knowledge that she only has in principle
(Konolige 1984; Levesque 1984; Lakemeyer 1986; Vardi 1986). This section intro-
duces the semantic models that will allow us to differentiate the two notions.
We assume that the reader is familiar with classical epistemic logic (EL; Hintikka
1962). We have already stated our motivation for working with this: even though this
system fails for its intended interpretation of ‘full-blooded knowledge’, like so many
logical systems, it has turned out quite adequate for other, perhaps originally non-
intended interpretations. In particular, it deals well with implicit knowledge of the
semantic range kind (cf. van Benthem and Martínez 2008).
In a nutshell, the language of epistemic logic extends that of propositional logic
with an operator K creating new formulas Kϕ that are read as “the agent knows ϕ”.
Semantically, we consider a set of possible worlds carrying valuations, with an acces-
sibility relation indicating which world or situations the agent considers possible. Here
boolean connectives are interpreted as usual, and Kϕ is true at a world w iff ϕ is true
in all the worlds that the agent considers possible from w.
Awareness logics (due to Fagin and Halpern (1988) and taken up in an extensive
further literature) extend the base language of EL with an operator Aϕ saying that the
agent “is aware of ϕ” (in less psychological terms, she “entertains ϕ”). Notice that
this is a matter of attention, and does not imply any attitude pro or con: the agent may
believe ϕ, but also reject it. Stated in other, but related terms, “awareness of” does not
imply “awareness that”.
Definition 2.1 (Language L) Let P be a set of atomic propositions. Formulas ϕ of the
epistemic awareness language L are given by
ϕ ::= p | Aϕ | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | Kϕ
with p ∈ P. Other Boolean connectives ∨,→,↔, as well the existential modal oper-
ator ( ̂K ) are defined as usual.
Formulas Aϕ are read as “the agent is aware of ϕ”, and formulas Kϕ as “the agent
knows ϕ implicitly”. The language is interpreted in epistemic models assigning to the
agent a set of formulas in each world, representing the information she is aware of
(Fagin and Halpern 1988).
Definition 2.2 (Semantic model) An epistemic awareness model is a tuple M =
〈W, R, A, V 〉 where
– 〈W, R, V 〉 is a standard epistemic model: a set of worlds W , an accessibility
relation R ⊆ (W × W ), and a valuation V : P → ℘(W ).
– A : W → ℘(L) is the “awareness” function giving the formulas that the agent
‘has in mind’. A(w) is the awareness set at w.
As usual, a pointed model (M, w) also has a distinguished world w.
The semantic interpretation of formulas in L is entirely as expected:
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Definition 2.3 Let (M, w) be a pointed semantic model with M = 〈W, R, A, V 〉.
Atomic propositions and boolean connectives are interpreted as usual; for Aϕ and Kϕ
we have:
(M, w) |
 Aϕ iff ϕ ∈ A(w)
(M, w) |
 Kϕ iff for all u ∈ W, Rwu implies (M, u) |
 ϕ.
On these models we can impose standard epistemic assumptions about the acces-
sibility relation, such as reflexivity, transitivity, and symmetry. Moreover, further con-
ditions can be imposed on the A-sets, like closure under commutation for conjunction
and disjunction, or being generated by some subset of atomic propositions.1 Never-
theless, these requirements are orthogonal to our main concerns in this paper, and we
will not assume any of them.
It is easy to visualize how our mixed models work:
Example 1
In this one-world model, the agent knows implicitly that p and also
that q. But while she is explicitly aware that p holds, she is not aware
that q holds, so her explicit knowledge about p, q differs.
In models with more than one world, a genuine issue of interplay arises: is awareness
introspective? Here is an appealing property: being ‘aware of’ is implicitly known:
Weak introspection. The formulas that the agent is aware of are preserved under
epistemic accessibility: that is, if ϕ ∈ A(w) and Rwu, then
ϕ ∈ A(u).2
Nevertheless, as mentioned before, we will not require any property in our intended
class of models.
The calculus of reasoning with these notions is standard. The valid formulas of L
are those provable in the minimal modal logic K for implicit knowledge. In the case
of the ‘weak introspection’ property, we just need the following axiom:
Aϕ → K Aϕ
Soundness and completeness are proved by standard techniques.
3 Defining explicit knowledge
Explicit knowledge as a defined notion. Combining implicit and awareness informa-
tion produces several kinds of explicit information. Options start with the Kϕ ∧ Aϕ
1 Such conditions are studied in depth in Fagin and Halpern (1988) and, more recently, in Halpern (2001).
2 Note the effect of this property in combination with properties of R. With preorders, A becomes persistent;
with equivalence relations, A becomes a function from equivalence classes to sets of formulas.
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of Fagin and Halpern (1988), which says that ϕ is implicitly known and explicitly
considered. But there are others. Personally, we favour:
Ex ϕ := K (ϕ ∧ Aϕ)
which is equivalent to Kϕ ∧ K Aϕ.3 Both definitions satisfy the desideratum that
explicit knowledge should imply implicit knowledge. Moreover, when the accessi-
bility relation is transitive and euclidean, we get the following forms of positive and
negative implicit introspection:
Ex ϕ → K Ex ϕ ¬Ex ϕ → K¬Ex ϕ
In what follows, our main focus will be on the dynamics of awareness, and nothing
very much hinges on the precise choice of the notion of explicit knowledge. Hence-
forth, we will work with the definition Ex ϕ := K (ϕ ∧ Aϕ) for explicit knowledge
(“awareness that”).4
Explicit knowledge as a primitive notion. It may be useful at this stage to explain how
we are deviating here from our earlier work (van Benthem 2008; Velázquez-Quesada
2009). There we assumed a primitive notion of explicit knowledge, treated as a map
assigning a set of formulas to each world, just like our A function here. For a proper
representation of explicit knowledge, we then needed to assume that all formulas in
such sets were implicitly known, and hence in particular, that they were true. But this
property is not preserved by standard update operations, since an epistemic formula
true in a given pointed model may not be true after a public announcement: say, an
ignorance statement may now have turned to knowledge. Other natural actions may
change truth values of formulas involving A. Based on these observations, we found
a need for dropping all persistence of explicit knowledge under update, except for
purely factual assertions without modal operators. Our current approach to defining
explicit knowledge will turn out to circumvent this difficulty, since the definition auto-
matically ‘recomputes’ what is explicit knowledge following a dynamic update with
epistemic side-effects.
For now, we move to our second main issue, viz. how agents can ‘improve’ their
current brand of knowledge about a proposition. This is not a matter of static implica-
tions between brands of implicit and explicit knowledge. As we have said before, the
correct question to ask here is a dynamic one: what does an agent have to do to upgrade
her implicit knowledge? To some readers, introducing the explicit actions that lead
to more omniscient states may demystify them. In Conan Doyle’s detective stories,
the explanation offered at the end turns Holmes’ ‘magical powers’ into a sequence of
3 In general, this definition is not equivalent to that of Fagin and Halpern, but it is if we assume weak
introspection plus reflexivity of accessibility. Then we get K (ϕ ∧ Aϕ) ↔ (Kϕ ∧ Aϕ).
4 Another candidate that appeals to us is Kϕ ∧ AKϕ, where the implicit knowledge itself has the agent’s
explicit attention. We will not pursue this option—but once again, our framework can describe the dynamics
of many proposals.
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simple observations and deductive acts, making the procedure “elementary, my dear
Watson”. While this is true, it also underscores the power of successive small steps.
4 Operations on epistemic awareness models
Our epistemic awareness models suggest a natural and simple dynamics. Though the
agent is not logically omniscient anymore, she can get new information by various
acts, including observation and inference. But we want to dig deeper. In line with
our definition for explicit knowledge, it also makes sense to look for simple actions
transforming models that can be put together to analyze more complex informational
acts. We will see later on how these transform explicit knowledge.
Defining the basic actions. Our models have two separate components for repre-
senting information: the accessibility relation and the awareness sets. The following
operations modify these components in a simple way, allowing us to define complex
epistemic actions later on.
The consider operation represents an “awareness raising” action:
Definition 4.1 (The consider operation) Let M = 〈W, R, A, V 〉 be a model and χ
any formula in L. The model M+χ = 〈W, R, A′, V 〉 is M with its awareness sets
extended with χ , that is,
A′(w) := A(w) ∪ {χ} for every w ∈ W
‘Considering’ extends the propositions that an agent is aware of, but we can also
define a drop operation with the opposite effect: reducing awareness sets. This fits
with the operational idea that agents can expand and shrink the set of issues having
their current attention.
Definition 4.2 (The drop operation) Let M = 〈W, R, A, V 〉 be a model and χ a for-
mula in L. The model M−χ = 〈W, R, A′, V 〉 reduces M’s awareness sets by removing
χ , that is,
A′(w) := A(w) \ {χ} for every w ∈ W
This operation can be seen as a form of ‘forgetting’, an action usually disregarded
in dynamic-epistemic logic (but see van Ditmarsch et al. (2009) and van Ditmarsch
and French (2009) for proposals).
The preceding actions affect what an agent is aware of. The next, known from
dynamic-epistemic logic, modifies her implicit knowledge by discarding those worlds
where some observed formula χ fails:
Definition 4.3 (Implicit observation) Let M = 〈W, R, A, V 〉 be a model and χ a
formula in L. The model M!χ = 〈W ′, R′, A′, V ′〉 has
– W ′ := {w ∈ W | (M, w) |
 χ } − R′ := R ∩ (W ′ × W ′)
– A′(w) := A(w) for every w ∈ W ′ − V ′(w) := V (w) for every w ∈ W ′
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The observation is implicit because, although it removes worlds, it does not affect
what the agent is aware of in the preserved ones.
Building complex actions. Complex actions can now be built by combining basic
ones. As an example, it seems natural to think that a public observation of some fact
is in fact done consciously, generating awareness. The corresponding operation of
“explicit seeing” can be defined in our framework.
Fact The explicit seeing operation, analogous in its effect to a Public Announcement in
EL (Plaza 1989; Gerbrandy 1999), can be defined by means of an implicit observation
followed by an act of consideration:
MES(χ) := (M!χ )+χ
The definition also works if we interchange the order of the operations—the reason
being that we are transforming two independent components of our models.5
Preserving static constraints. Though we have not imposed strong constraints on
our static models, it is interesting to note that some reasonable requirements, like
weak introspection and equivalence relations for accessibility, are preserved by our
operations.
Proposition 1 The consider operation preserves weak introspection and equivalence
relations.
Proof The equivalence property of R is obviously preserved, since R is not modified.
For weak introspection, take a world w in M+χ and any ϕ ∈ A′(w). Suppose Rwu.
If ϕ is already in A(w), then ϕ ∈ A(u) because M satisfies the principle, and then
ϕ ∈ A′(u) by the definition of A′. If ϕ is not in A(w), then it should be χ itself, which
by definition is also in A′(u). unionsq
By a similar argument, the drop operation, too, preserves the two properties.
Proposition 2 Dropping preserves equivalence relations and weak introspection.
Finally, our actions of implicit observation have the same effect:
Proposition 3 Implicit observation preserves weak introspection and equivalence
relations.
Proof Equivalence relations are preserved automatically since we go to a sub-model.
Next, for weak introspection, use the fact that the sub-model M!χ has the same
5 Still, one might argue that implicit observation and considering take place simultaneously. While this
makes sense, we will not pursue it here.
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awareness sets at its worlds as M , while its epistemic accessibility is a subrelation
of that for M . unionsq
It is also worthwhile to notice how closure properties one might impose on the
A-sets (cf. the already mentioned closure under commutation for conjunction and dis-
junction, or being generated by some subset of atomic propositions, as in cf. Fagin
and Halpern (1988)) are not preserved by the operations consider and drop. Indeed,
we think these properties over-idealize the content over agents’ awareness.
5 The actions in action
Consider the following model:
In the leftmost world the agent does not even know
implicitly that q. But she knows implicitly that p, though
not explicitly.
After the agent considers p, we get the model on the
right: in both worlds, the agent now knows explicitly
that p.
Lifting a restriction in van Benthem (2008), Velázquez-Quesada (2009), our agent
can also get explicit knowledge about her own awareness, or implicit and explicit
information. Here is how this can happen:
When she considers Ex p, we get the model on the
left. The agent knows explicitly that she has explicit
knowledge of p. By acting, she has achieved positive
introspection.6
Next, consider the above explicit seeing of q: an implicit observation
followed by consideration of q. This yields the model on the right
where q is now explicitly known by the agent (Ex q).
6 We are cheating a little here, since Ex p is really a defined notion in the language.
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Finally, dropping p makes the agent lose earlier explicit knowledge
about it (in our case, we get ¬Ex p). Moreover, by our definition of
explicit knowledge, she no longer has explicit knowledge that Ex p,
since the latter formula is no longer true, and therefore, it is no longer
implicitly known.7
There are many further scenarios with complex many-world patterns, but the above
will suffice to show the interest of our setting.
6 A complete dynamic logic
In order to express how our dynamic operations affect implicit knowledge, aware-
ness, and explicit knowledge, we extend the static epistemic awareness language with
modalities representing each basic operation. If χ and ϕ are formulas in the resulting
extended language (still called L in this section), then so are
[+χ ]ϕ after the agent considers χ , ϕ is the case.
[−χ ]ϕ after the agent drops χ , ϕ is the case.
[!χ ]ϕ after the agent implicit observes χ , ϕ is the case.
Definition 6.1 Let (M, w) be a pointed semantic model with M = 〈W, R, A, V 〉, and
let χ, ϕ be formulas in the extended language L:
(M, w) |
 [+χ ]ϕ iff (M+χ ,w) |
 ϕ
(M, w) |
 [−χ ]ϕ iff (M−χ ,w) |
 ϕ
(M, w) |
 [!χ ]ϕ iff (M, w) |
 χ implies (M!χ ,w) |
 ϕ
The main difference among the new modalities is the precondition. The agent can
consider or drop a formula χ without any further requirement, but for her to implicitly
observe χ , χ needs to be true.
6.1 Dynamic completeness theorem
We now formulate a sound and complete logic for the semantic validities in the
extended language L:
Theorem 1 The valid formulas of the dynamic-epistemic awareness language L (in
epistemic awareness models) are just those provable by the axioms and rules for the
static base language (see Sect. 2) plus the reduction axioms and modal inference rules
listed in Table 1.
7 This may seem strange since the formula Ex p still occurs in the world, but this only means that the agent
is aware of it, not that she still endorses it.
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Proof We use standard techniques from dynamic-epistemic logic (cf. van Benthem
et al. 2006). Our axioms run through all cases needed to reduce a innermost occurrence
of a dynamic operator. Iterating this produces an equivalent formula in the static base
language. unionsq
These axioms express the syntactic basics of the considering and dropping oper-
ations, merged with the axioms of public announcement logic PAL (Plaza 1989;
Gerbrandy 1999). For instance, how do the propositions that the agent is aware of
change when the agent considers χ? Our axioms show the two possibilities. After
considering χ , the agent is aware of a ϕ = χ iff she was aware of ϕ before; but also,
considering χ always makes the agent aware of χ . The drop operation has an analogous
effect in the opposite direction. The rest of the axioms are simple commutation clauses,
indicating the independence of modifying the domain of worlds and the awareness sets.
6.2 How the logic describes our major issues
Our logic states how each basic operator of the language is affected by our three
actions. By combining effects and unfolding definitions, the logic also explains how
derived notions of explicit knowledge fare under these actions. We discuss a few cases,
using our earlier definition K (ϕ ∧ Aϕ), and suppressing detailed calculations:
Explicit knowledge. For the action of considering χ and explicit knowledge about
a different formula ϕ, an application of the reduction axioms gives us the following
valid principle
[+χ ]Ex ϕ ↔ K ([+χ ]ϕ ∧ Aϕ) (for ϕ = χ).
We leave it to the reader to put this analysis into words. One might have expected a
simpler direct reduction principle [+χ ]Ex ϕ ↔ Ex ϕ, but this formula is not valid,
since the consider action may have changed truth values for sub-formulas of ϕ.
Table 1 Sound and complete logic for dynamic epistemic awareness logic
 [+χ ]p ↔ p  [−χ ]p ↔ p
 [+χ ]Aϕ ↔ Aϕ for ϕ = χ  [−χ ]Aϕ ↔ Aϕ for ϕ = χ
 [+χ ]Aχ ↔   [−χ ]Aχ ↔ ⊥
 [+χ ]¬ϕ ↔ ¬[+χ ]ϕ  [−χ ]¬ϕ ↔ ¬[−χ ]ϕ
 [+χ ](ϕ ∧ ψ) ↔ [+χ ]ϕ ∧ [+χ ]ψ  [−χ ](ϕ ∧ ψ) ↔ [−χ ]ϕ ∧ [−χ ]ψ
 [+χ ]Kϕ ↔ K [+χ ]ϕ  [−χ ]Kϕ ↔ K [−χ ]ϕ
From  ϕ infer  [+χ ]ϕ From  ϕ infer  [−χ ]ϕ
 [!χ ]p ↔ χ → p
 [!χ ]Aϕ ↔ χ → Aϕ
 [!χ ]¬ϕ ↔ χ → ¬[!χ ]ϕ
 [!χ ](ϕ ∧ ψ) ↔ [!χ ]ϕ ∧ [!χ ]ψ
 [!χ ]Kϕ ↔ χ → K [!χ ]ϕ
From  ϕ infer  [!χ ]ϕ
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In the particular case of explicit knowledge about χ itself, however, we get the
following.
Fact The formula [+χ ]Ex χ ↔ Kχ is valid.
Proof Using our reduction axioms, we get
[+χ ]Ex χ ↔ [+χ ]K (χ ∧ Aχ)
↔ K [+χ ]χ ∧ K [+χ ]Aχ
↔ K [+χ ]χ
But the latter is equivalent to Kχ , since we have quite generally that
the formula χ ↔ [+χ ]χ is valid.
The reason is that, given our semantics, an act of considering χ can only change truth
values for Aχ and formulas containing it. But the formula χ itself is too short to be
affected by this. unionsq
This shows how a consider action makes implicit knowledge explicit. Next, going
back to the initial discussion about the distribution axiom, the formula
Ex (ϕ → ψ) → (Ex ϕ → K ψ)
is valid, since the antecedent implies the premises of the distribution law for K . Then,
considering is the action that ‘fills the gap’:
Ex (ϕ → ψ) → (Ex ϕ → [+ψ]Ex ψ) is valid
One might think that the real act here is a richer one of drawing the inference, but
in our analysis it is the explicit consideration of the conclusion that ‘gives the last little
push’ toward explicit knowledge.
Thus, our current proposal realizes the intuitive expectations in our Introduction.
But it can describe more, including the behaviour of explicit knowledge under the
drop operation. Here is what happens with formulas ϕ that differ from the dropped χ :
[−χ ]Ex ϕ ↔ K ([−χ ]ϕ ∧ Aϕ) (for ϕ = χ)
For explicit knowledge about χ itself, we get the following.
Fact The formula [−χ ]Ex χ ↔ K⊥ is valid.
Proof Using our reduction axioms as above,
[−χ ]Ex χ ↔ [−χ ]K (χ ∧ Aχ)
↔ K ([−χ ]χ ∧ [−χ ]Aχ)
↔ K ([−χ ]χ ∧ ⊥)
↔ K⊥ unionsq
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Under the natural requirement of consistency for knowledge (technically, seriality
for the accessibility relation), this validity becomes
¬[−χ ]Ex χ
read as “one never has explicit knowledge about χ after dropping it”.
Still, even after dropping it, the agent does keep χ as implicit knowledge, witness
the following valid law:
Fact The formula Ex χ → [−χ ]Kχ is valid.
Proof
Ex χ → Kχ ∧ K Aχ
→ Kχ
→ K [−χ ]χ
→ [−χ ]Kχ
Our proof uses the validity of
χ ↔ [−χ ]χ
whose justification is analogous to the one for χ ↔ [+χ ]χ unionsq
Finally, we analyze the effect of an implicit observation over explicit knowledge.
For any ϕ and χ , unfolding the definition of explicit knowledge via our axioms (we
suppress intermediate steps here) gives
[!χ ]Ex ϕ ↔ (χ → K ([!χ ]ϕ ∧ (χ → Aϕ)))
Again, we leave it to the reader to state this fact informally. This outcome is our solu-
tion to the earlier-mentioned problem of update making explicit knowledge ‘out of
synch’ with implicit knowledge. (Recall that this was the reason for the restriction to
purely factual assertions in van Benthem (2008), Velázquez-Quesada (2009)). Explicit
knowledge is now a defined notion, so it automatically re-adjusts to whatever happens
to the modalities K and A, and our logic tells us precisely how.
We have extracted the effect of our basic epistemic actions over explicit knowledge
defined as K (ϕ ∧ Aϕ). Thus, we replace discussion whether agents have epistemic
closure by a much richer picture of what they can do to update and “upgrade” their
knowledge.
Moreover, this style of analysis works not only for the stated notion of explicit
knowledge; it can also provide us with validities expressing the way other possible
notions of explicit knowledge are affected by dynamic actions, like the already men-
tioned Kϕ ∧ AKϕ.
123 [256]
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6.3 Schematic validities and algebra of actions
While all this seems straightforward dynamic epistemic technique, there is a catch. In
deriving the principles of the previous section, we have used more than the reduction
axioms of our logic per se. Several important ‘schematic’ principles did not follow
from our reduction axioms. In particular, we have used the two principles
[+χ ]χ ↔ χ and [−χ ]χ ↔ χ
whose validity involved additional considerations. Of course, each specific instance
of such a formula can be derived, given our completeness theorem. But that does not
mean there is any illuminating uniform derivation of an “algebraic” sort. Indeed, an
explicit characterization of the schematic validities in dynamic-epistemic logics (valid
for all substitutions of formulas for proposition letters) is a well-known open problem
(cf. van Benthem 2010), even in the case of public announcement logic. Given the
clear interest of such general principles here, that problem becomes even more urgent.
Algebra of actions. We end with one particular source of schematic validities. As
important as it is to understand how actions affect our information, their general alge-
braic structure is of interest, too. We briefly discuss some validities, to show that
“algebra of actions” raises some interesting issues:
– In general, drop does not neutralize consider: [+χ ][−χ ]ϕ ↔ ϕ is not valid. If the
agent is initially aware of χ , consider makes no change, but drop does, yielding a
model where χ is not in the awareness set. The actual validity is the qualified
¬Aχ → ([+χ ][−χ ]ϕ ↔ ϕ)
– The dual case behaves in the same way: consider does not neutralize drop in
general—but we do have:
Aχ → ([−χ ][+χ ]ϕ ↔ ϕ)
As for unqualified algebraic laws, we do have idempotence:
– A sequence of consider actions for the same formula has the same effect as a single
one, and the drop operation behaves similarly:
[+χ ]ϕ ↔ [+χ ][+χ ]ϕ and [−χ ]ϕ ↔ [−χ ][−χ ]ϕ
Next, given the dynamics of the system, we do not expect strong commutation
laws between considering and dropping. Nevertheless, we do expect commutation of
these operations with implicit observation, since the latter modifies an independent
component of our models. For example, the following formulas,
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[!χ ][+χ ]ϕ ↔ [+χ ][!χ ]ϕ and [!χ ][−χ ]ϕ ↔ [−χ ][!χ ]ϕ,
are valid even for formulas χ using the modality A.8
We will not pursue this action algebra here (there are even more validities when we
restrict attention to just factual assertions), but it clearly involves uniform schematic
validities once more that are not immediately obvious from our earlier completeness
theorem.9
7 From single to multi-agent scenarios
So far, we have considered activities of single agents, including their observations, but
also their acts of inference. Now the latter are typically private, and hence it makes
sense to look at scenarios with privacy. But a bit paradoxically, privacy only becomes
visible in a multi-agent setting.10 Here is a first simple illustration, with two agents:
Example 2 Consider the following model M , generalizing the single-agent frame-
work to a multi-agent setting in a straightforward way:
In the only world of the model, each agent knows implicitly that p,
but no agent is aware of p (¬A1 p ∧ ¬A2 p). Moreover, agents have
implicit higher-order knowledge about each other. E.g., agent 2 knows
implicitly that agent 1 is not aware of p (K2¬A1 p).
Now let an event take place: agent 1 considers p: M(1,+p) is given by
In the new situation, agent 1 is aware of p (A1 p), and now has explicit
knowledge about it. But there is more: agent 2 now knows implic-
itly that agent 1 is aware of p (K2A1 p), but without knowing this
explicitly.
Is this a realistic scenario? Independently of the modelling, it seems strange that
an internal action that takes place only in agent 1’s mind can affect the information
of agent 2. To get clearer on this, we need a more detailed analysis of how epistemic
awareness models should change in a setting allowing privacy.
8 The reason is, once again, that [+χ ] and [−χ ] can only change the truth value of Aχ , and hence that of
χ cannot be affected.
9 Here is one more analogy with public announcement logic PAL. The latter system, too, has an algebra
of actions, viz. successive announcements—but it tends to go unnoticed, as two successive announcements
can be compressed into a single one. This compression disappears when the operation changes the accessi-
bility relation, as it is done in dynamic-epistemic logics for changes in belief or preferences: two successive
upgrades cannot be compressed into a single one (van Benthem and Liu 2007; van Benthem 2007).
10 With a single agent, the private is the public realm.
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7.1 Multi-agent static framework
The extension of the static epistemic awareness framework to a setting with many
agents in a group Ag is straightforward. In the language of multi-agent L, we just
add agent indexes to the A and the K modalities (Ai and Ki , respectively). In the
semantic models, R becomes a function from Ag to ℘(W × W ) returning an acces-
sibility relation Ri for each agent i ∈ Ag, and A becomes a function from Ag × W
to ℘(L) returning the awareness set Ai (w) of each agent i at each possible world w.
The semantic interpretation of formulas is then as before, using Ai and Ri to interpret
formulas of the form Aiϕ and Kiϕ, respectively.
Again, in this multi-agent case we will not impose special semantic constraints. But
note how, in a setting with private actions, just as in DEL in general, we may want to
change our emphasis from knowledge to one on belief, since some actions may make
agents’ information out of synch with reality.
7.2 Multi-agent actions: the general case
To make our actions private, we need a mechanism that lets actions affect agents in
different ways. The action models of Baltag et al. (1999) will do this, provided we
extend them in essentially the manner of van Benthem et al. (2006). That is, events can
now really change the world, coming not just with preconditions on their executability,
but also with postconditions describing what changes they bring about:
Definition 7.1 (Multi-agent action model) With P the set of atomic propositions and
Ag the finite set of agents, a multi-agent action model is a tuple E = 〈S, T, Pre, Pos〉
where:
– 〈S, T, Pre〉 is an action model (Baltag et al. 1999) with S a finite non-empty set of
events, T : Ag → ℘(W × W ) a function returning an accessibility relation Ti for
each agent i ∈ Ag and Pre : S → L the precondition function indicating where
each event can be executed.
– Pos : (Ag × S × ℘(L)) → ℘(L) is the postcondition function, assigning a new
set of formulas in L to every tuple of an agent, event, and (old) set of formulas
in L.
A pointed action model (E, s) has a distinguished event s.
Recall that we want to model private versions of our operations that modify aware-
ness sets. This is exactly the role of the Pos function, a generalization of the substitution
function in van Benthem et al. (2006) for representing factual change. The following
update rule describes how our action models modify epistemic awareness models.
Definition 7.2 (Product update) Let M = 〈W, R, A, V 〉 be a multi-agent semantic
model and let E = 〈S, T, Pre, Pos〉 be a multi-agent action model. The product model
M ⊗ E = 〈W ′, R′, A′, V ′〉 is given by
– W ′ := { (w, s) | (M, w) |
 Pre(s) } − R′i (w, s)(w′, s′)iff Riww′& Ti ss′
– V ′(w, s) := V (w) − A′i (w, s) := Posi (s, Ai (w))
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Note how the Pos function works: for each agent i and each event s, Pos takes agent
i’s awareness set at w in M , and returns her awareness set at (w, s) in M ⊗ E . Later on,
we will look at restrictions on the syntactic format of definition for the postcondition
function.11
In order to express how product updates affect the agents’ information, the extended
multi-agent language L has extra modalities:
if (E, s) is a pointed action model and ϕ is a formula in
the extended multi-agent L, then so is [(E, s)]ϕ.
The semantic interpretation of these new formulas is as follows:
Definition 7.3 Let (M, w) be a pointed multi-agent semantic model and let (E, s) be
a pointed action model with E = 〈S, T, Pre, Pos〉.
(M, w) |
 [(E, s)]ϕ iff (M, w) |
 Pre(s) implies (M ⊗ E, (w, s)) |
 ϕ
Now it is time to look at concrete cases illustrating the mechanism.
7.3 Public considering and dropping
For a start, our multi-agent setting generalizes the single agent case, since we can
define action models for our earlier (now public) consider and drop operations.
Definition 7.4 (Public consider action) Let χ be a formula in multi-agent L. The
action of agent j publicly considering χ is the pointed action model (Pub j+χ , •) with
Pub j+χ = 〈S, T, Pre, Pos〉 given by
−S := {•} − Ti := {(•, •)} for every agent i − Pre(•) := 
− Pos j (•, X) := X ∪ {χ},
− Posi (•, X) := X for i = j
The diagram on the right shows the action model Pub1+χ in
the 2-agent case (with the preconditions omitted).
11 Substitution functions are highly constrained and simply definable, our Pos function is much less
constrained, though in cases of interest, it, too, usually has a simple syntactic definition.
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Definition 7.5 (Public drop action) Let χ be any formula in multi-agent L. The action
of agent j publicly dropping χ , given by the pointed action model (Pub j−χ , •), differs
from public considering only in its postcondition function for agent j in •:
Pos j (•, X) := X \ {χ}
The public versions of the actions have just one event, and their accessibility rela-
tions Ti indicate that all involved agents recognize this. Moreover, the precondition in
the lonely world is simply . Then, the application of (Pub j+χ , •) ((Pub j−χ , •), resp.)
on a multi-agent static model M yields a copy of M in which χ has been added to
(respectively, removed from) the awareness set of agent j in all worlds.
7.4 Private considering and dropping
But our mechanism can also define private actions. Here are simple versions of the ear-
lier consider and drop. As usual, these encode what takes place, but also how different
agents ‘view’ this:
Definition 7.6 (Private consider action) Let χ be any formula in multi-agent L. The
action of agent j privately considering χ yields the pointed action model (Pri j+χ , •)
with Pri j+χ = 〈S, T, Pre, Pos〉 as
−S := {•, ◦} − Ti :=
{{(•, •), (◦, ◦)} if i = j
{(•, ◦), (◦, ◦)} otherwise − Pre(•) = Pre(◦) := 
− Pos j (•, X) := X ∪ {χ}, Pos j (◦, X) := X
− Posi (•, X) := X, Posi (◦, X) := X for i = j
The diagram on the right shows the
model Pri1+χ for 2 agents (preconditions
again omitted).
Definition 7.7 (Private drop action) Let χ be any formula in multi-agent L. The action
of agent j privately dropping χ , given by the pointed action model (Pri j−χ , •), differs
from private considering only in its postcondition function for agent j in •:
Pos j (•, X) := X \ {χ}
The difference between the public and the private version of the actions is that the
private actions involve two events: one in which χ is added to (removed from) agent
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j’s awareness set (the event •), and another in which there is no change (the event ◦).
Moreover, the accessibility relations Ti indicate that, while j recognizes which event
is the real one (our •), the other agents do not consider that event possible, sticking
to the ‘no change’ option. Then, the application of (Pri j+χ , •) ((Pri j−χ , •), resp.) on
a multi-agent static model M yields a model containing two copies of M : one, rec-
ognized as the real one only by j , in which j’s awareness set changed, and another,
viewed by the other agents as the only possibility, in which nothing happened.
Example 3 Recall the model M from Example 2. After agent 1 considers p privately
(i.e., after applying (Pri1+p, •)), we get a better version of our initial example that
started the thread of this section:
In the evaluation point, here the leftmost world, agent 1 is
aware of p (A1 p), just like she does after publicly consid-
ering p. But this time, agent 2’s implicit belief does not
change: she continues to believe implicitly that agent 1 is
not aware of p (K2¬A1 p).
7.5 Unconscious versions
The flexibility of the postcondition mechanism is great. We can represent many further
scenarios, even unconscious actions, hidden from all agents, including the one that
‘performs’ it! We just give an illustration:
Definition 7.8 (Unconscious drop action) Let χ be a formula in the multi-agent L.
The action of agent j unconsciously dropping χ yields the pointed action model
(Unc j−χ , •), differs from its private counterpart only in the definition of the accessi-
bility relation:
Ti := {(•, ◦), (◦, ◦)} for every agent i
The diagram on the left depicts Unc1−χ
in a 2-agent scenario.
Example 4 Consider the model (M ⊗ Pri1+p, (p, •)) of Example 3. If agent 1 uncon-
sciously drops p, we get the following updated model:
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In ((p, •), •), the agent is not aware
of p (¬A1 p), but she implicitly
believes that she is aware of it
(K1A1 p).
The updated model contains two copies of the original one. Here, agent 1 considers
only the rightmost world of the upper copy, and agent 2 only the rightmost world of
the lower one.
Much more can be said about this scenario, and we feel that we have a promising
take here on unconscious actions such as forgetting. But our purpose here was just to
demonstrate the flexibility of the framework.
7.6 Completeness of the multi-agent system
In principle, there is a complete dynamic logic for our product-update mechanism for
awareness, and it looks like our earlier single-agent logic, with indices attached. Its
principles for atomic formulas, Boolean operations, and implicit knowledge are the
usual ones from the dynamic-epistemic logic DEL. As an illustration, we have the
valid equivalence




But to formulate a precise result, the crucial issue is stating the right reduction
axiom for awareness given the postconditions. Consider the earlier axioms that we
gave for our two basic syntactic operations of consider and drop. These described
the postconditions (the effect of the operations on the A-sets) inside the language,
exploiting the simple format of their effects. For instance, we have ϕ in our A-set after
an act +χ if we had ϕ before, or ϕ is actually the just added formula χ . This case
distinction in the reduction axiom reflects directly the simple disjunctive definition of
the postcondition for the action +χ : A′(w) := A(w) ∪ {χ}.
The same is true in our more general setting with action models: simple uniform
definitions of postconditions in our action models will allow us to provide matching
reduction axioms. We will not pursue the technicalities of this mechanism here, but
just say this. To get a proper completeness theorem, there should be a simple defini-
tion scheme δ(φ) within our language for postconditions of awareness-set changing
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events, stating when a formula φ belongs to the new set. The syntax of this scheme
can then be used to derive reduction axioms.12
We have merely made some proposals, and explored a simple syntactic version of
DEL product update. But even at this preliminary stage, our private awareness analysis
seems an interesting extensions of the scope of standard dynamic epistemic logic.
8 Other approaches
Many approaches deal with the problem of logical omniscience. Here we mention
some of them, and their relation to our work.
Static approaches. A crucial idea in the logical omniscient discussion is to differ-
entiate between what the agent actually knows and what follows from this explicit
knowledge. Then, explicit knowledge is weakened somehow, obtaining in this way an
agent that does not know explicitly everything that follows from her explicit knowl-
edge. In (Konolige 1984), the author studied agents with arbitrary rules of inference;
Levesque (Levesque 1984) introduced partial and incoherent situations. Our approach
has followed the already mentioned influential Fagin and Halpern (1988) in using a
syntactic notion of awareness (an idea that, as indicated by an anonymous referee, goes
back to syntactic notions of knowledge (Eberle 1974; Moore and Hendrix 1979)).
All these approaches deal with agents with limited information, but what seems new
in our approach is the way in which we study explicit actions of awareness change.
Temporal approaches. When dealing with dynamic systems that evolve, another
approach is to look at them from a temporal perspective. Indeed, Fagin and Halpern
(1988), Elgot-Drapkin and Perlis (1990) and Duc (1997) have explored how the infor-
mation (knowledge, or beliefs) of an agent change over time. Nevertheless, what we
add here is an explicit constructive account of the local dynamics that creates these
temporal histories.
Other dynamic approaches. In the work of Jago (2006) and later Jago (2009) applica-
tion of inference rules are indicated explicitly in the logical language. These are then
studied in an abstract dynamic logic style, while we provide DEL-style constructive
model transformations.
Earlier DEL approaches. Unlike recent approaches to inferential dynamics (van Ben-
them 2008; Velázquez-Quesada 2009), our agents’ explicit knowledge is not only
about factual formulas. It also includes ‘higher’ information about their own infor-
mation. While this may seem a small ‘in-house’ difference, it is a big step forward
in the DEL-style treatment of awareness dynamics. In this connection, Grossi and
Velázquez-Quesada (2009) also deals with higher-order information. The present
12 The system for epistemic and factual change in (van Benthem et al. 2006) is an illustration, exploiting
the fact that postconditions of its events were definable as simple syntactic substitutions.
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proposal extends this to a real multi-agent treatment, allowing us to handle public,
private and even unconscious versions of the consider and drop actions.
9 Conclusions and further directions
Our paper shows how a significant informational dynamics can take place over exist-
ing epistemic awareness models, generalizing acts of observation and inference. We
also show how this leads to perspicuous useful technical systems and results about
these, in the spirit of dynamic epistemic logic. Thus, we have shown that the ‘reduc-
tionist approach’ to explicit knowledge in terms of implicit semantic knowledge and
syntactic awareness is feasible and interesting in its own right.
Of course, we also found lots of open problems. Our multi-agent setting can describe
many more agent activities than what we have shown, but we have only scratched
the surface. Also, many technical issues remain unresolved: in particular, the issue
of schematic validities and action algebra, and the precise logic of postconditions,
dependent on their format of definition.
But beyond this, we also see drawbacks to the approach taken here. In particular,
we still feel that the reductionist approach, which solves the long-standing problem of
dealing with complex formulas, also has its drawbacks. In an intuitive sense, explicit
knowledge may be sui generis, and not reducible to implicit knowledge plus aware-
ness in any of the existing senses in the literature. I might be thinking of ϕ, and also
know it implicitly, and still fail to see directly that it is true. Think of a conclusion
that I am pondering, and that in fact follows from some premises whose truth I am
aware of. I could still fail to see how it follows explicitly. In fact, this shows that we
have not analyzed real ‘acts of inference’, since for us, merely becoming aware of ϕ
was enough to upgrade knowledge from implicit to explicit.13 Thus, eventually we
want a much richer account of inference, allowing us to deal with important issues like
preferences over possible inferences and an explicit treatment of their justifications
(cf. Artemov and Nogina (2005) and related papers on ‘justification logics’).
A most urgent desideratum in our view concerns the interpretation shift in our multi-
agent section. It was beliefs of agents that made more sense there than knowledge. But
once we take beliefs seriously, we should redo our analysis in the setting of dynamic
logics for acts of belief revision (cf. Baltag and Smets 2008; van Benthem 2007) that
work over epistemic plausibility models. Indeed, it makes much sense to relate belief
revision, not just to new observations, but also to new inferences. This inferential
dynamics should then also include special mechanisms that affect belief, rather than
knowledge, that is: default rules. It is a significant issue how all this should be done.14
We refer to the dissertation Velázquez-Quesada (2011) for details and further results
on awareness dynamics, default reasoning, and belief revision.
13 Grossi and Velázquez-Quesada (2009) explore an explicit knowledge definition that involves a further
requirement: the formula should be acknowledged as true via a rule-based inference.
14 van Benthem (2009) is a first exploration, including some major changes in the plausibility relation,
that now does not just order worlds, but worlds plus partial syntactic descriptions.
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But our main point is not technical results, or concrete directions. It is rather the
general picture of agency arising from our analysis. We replaced agents with “super-
natural” abilities like omniscience by human ones that must, and can work to improve
their information. The resulting mathematical model is rich, and much more attractive
than the usual ones. We mentioned Sherlock Holmes at some point in our story, famous
for combining observation and deduction. Dynamic logics are about what makes this
tick. As visitors to Reichenbach Falls in Switzerland can see, our hero died a (fic-
tional) death at the hands of the evil mathematician Professor Moriarty. But though
these two minds were enemies, their fields were not. We hope to have shown how
delicate philosophical issues can profit from mathematical modeling.
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